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COMMENTS
The Doctrine of Dependent Relative
Revocation in Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
An effective revocation' of a will requires that two concurrent
conditions be fulfilled: decedent must have evidenced an intent to re-
voke-the animus revocandi-and an overt act
2 indicative of this intent.3
Questions ordinarily arise in cases in which the testator makes a valid
will, but then revokes the original bequest or will in connection with a
subsequent, invalid substitution. This often presents a court with an
election: it must either recognize the revocation of the original will,
which causes the estate or a part thereof to fall into intestacy or into the
residuary, or apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, which
results in a reinstatement of the original will or bequest.'
This comment will examine the theory of the doctrine of dependent
I. Revocation in Pennsylvania is governed by statute. The applicable statute pro-
vides,
No will or codicil in writing, or any part thereof, can be revoked or altered
otherwise than:
(1) Will or codicil. By some other will or codicil in writing;
(2) Other writing. By some other writing declaring the same, executed and
proved in the manner required of wills; or
(3) Act to the document. By being burnt, torn, canceled, obliterated, or
destroyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revocation, by the testator
himself or by another person in his presence and by his express direction. If such
act is done by any person other than the testator, the direction of the testator must
be proved by the oaths or affirmations of two competent witnesses.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (Purdon 1977).
2. "Not only must there be the present intent to revoke the testamentary writing, but
the overt act must be such as to intend accomplishment of a present revocation rather than a
contemplated future change of that instrument or writing." Deist Estate, 75 Pa. D. & C. 145,
152 (O.C. Som. 1950).
3. Parol declarations, without physical evidence of intent to revoke, are insufficient
to revoke a will. Hildebrand Will, 365 Pa. 551, 76 A.2d 202 (1950). An apparent act of
revocation that complies with the formalities of the Pennsylvania Wills Act establishes a
presumption of revocation that can be rebutted by evidence of a contrary intent. See Ervien
Will, 427 Pa. 64, 233 A.2d 887 (1967) (the decedent, who was blind, unintentionally discard-
ed her will among trash papers. The presumption of revocation was overcome by evidence
both of her blindness and of an absence of animus revocandi).
4. This assumes that ordinary will principles and presumptions cannot be invoked to
restore the original will. There are a number of Pennsylvania cases in which it is arguable
whether the doctrine or conventional will presumptions were applied. See cases cited in note
154 infra.
relative revocation, the present scope of its application in Pennsylvania,
and problems encountered whenever it is advocated.
II. A Problem of Definition
Since the doctrine's inception,5 commentators have been unable to
agree on a definition of dependent relative revocation. 6 A comparison
between two of the most commonly quoted definitions of the doctrine
dramatizes this point. Jarman states,
Where the act of destruction is connected with the making of
another will, so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator
meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of
the new disposition intended to be substituted, such will be the
legal effect of the transaction; and therefore, if the will intend-
ed to be substituted is inoperative from defect of attestation, or
any other cause, the revocation fails also, and the original will
remains in force . ...
Jarman's rendition of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation,
despite its age and the appearance of more modern definitions,8 has been
cited in many Pennsylvania court opinions, 9 and, until recently,'" has
been unquestioningly accepted as the accurate statement of the law as it
has been applied in Pennsylvania.
Atkinson puts forth a different view of the doctrine:
When a testator purports to revoke his will while laboring under
a mistake of law or fact in connection therewith, the courts
often declare that revocation is dependent upon the existence
of the situation as believed by the testator and accordingly hold
that the will is not revoked. Instead of this fiction of conditional
revocation, it is more realistic to treat the problem as one of
5. The origin of the doctrine is well explained in Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal
Cathedral Foundation, 187 F.2d 357, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1950) in which the court said,
There is nothing new or novel about the problem thus posed. At least as early
as 1716 the English courts were dealing with it. In that year Onions v. Tyrer was
decided, and the report of the opinion of Lord Chancellor Cowper (as it appears in
the Peere Williams reports) [I P. Wins. 344. 24 Eng. Rep. R. 418] shows in some
detail the reasoning of his Lordship. His view was that the cancellation of the first
will, although ordered by the testator, 'depended on the validity of the second
will, and ought to be taken as one act done at the same time, so that if the second
will is not valid, as the testator thought it was, and without which he would not
have cancelled the first, the cancelling the first will, depending thereon, ought to
be looked upon as null also, and therefore the first will as to the said lands, is still
subsisting and unrevoked.' His Lordship rested his conclusions upon the fact that
the disposition of the land in question in the second will was the same as it was in
the first will, which, he pointed out, 'shews he did not mean to revoke his first will
as to the devise of these lands, unless he might by the second will (at the same
time that he revoked the former) set up the like devise.'
6. Professor Warren places the blame for the polysyllabic tongue-twister on Mr.
Powell, author of POWELL ON DEVISES (1788), the first testbook on wills. See Warren,
Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HARV. L. REV. 337, 338 (1920).
7. 1 JARMAN, WILLS 135 (7th ed. 1930).
8. See, e.g., 2 PAGE, WILLS § 21.57 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1976); SuM. PA. JuR. INTES-
TACY AND WILLS, § 259 (Supp. 1977) [hereinafter referred to as PA. JUR.I. See also note II
and accompanying text infra.
9. See, e.g., Braun Estate, 358 Pa. 271,56 A.2d 201 (1948); Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa.
23 (1857); Baily Estate, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 225 (D. C. Montg. 1964).
10. See notes 173-74 and accompanying text infra.
mistake, holding the revocation absolute or void in accordance
with which position the individual testator would probably have
preferred. "
Some courts and writers such as Jarman refer to the doctrine as a
judicial tool for the ascertainment of the testator's actual intent. 1 2 Ac-
cordingly, a distinction must be made between three types of intents.
First, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation focuses on the intent
to revoke.' 3 This must not be confused with the second type of intent-
the intent to make a substitution.' 4 The third intent, a creature of the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation, is a fictional, conditional
intent.' 5 A court applying the doctrine construes this final species of
intent to grant relief in certain cases in which the testator's actual intent to
make a substitution is frustrated. The doctrine is superfluous if the
testator's actual intent can be honored.' 6 Purportedly, the fiction is
adopted to grant relief in accord "with what the testator would probably
have intended had he known of the error.'
17
A. The "Pole Star" Fallacy
The case law indicates that the mechanics of the doctrine are mis-
understood in Pennsylvania. The leading Pennsylvania case that express-
ly applied the doctrine, Braun Estate,'8 initiated a discussion of the
doctrine by deeming it "a rule of testamentary construction whose use
• . . is limited to aiding in the ascertainment of a testator's true in-
tent."' 19 The statement is patently incorrect. In Braun, there was an
express, written revocation of a former bequest by a codicil that failed to
include a dollar amount in the substituted bequest.2' Braun ignored the
I1. ATKINSON, WILLS § 88 (2d ed. 1953).
12. Braun Estate, 358 Pa. 271,56 A.2d 201 (1948) ("true intent"); PA. JUR., supra note
8, at § 259 ("actual intent").
13. See notes 61-68 and accompanying text infra.
14. The dissimilarity of these two forms of intent is demonstrated in Holt Estate, 405
Pa. 244, 174 A.2d 874 (1961), and in Emernecker's Estate, 218 Pa. 369, 67 A. 701 (1907). See
note 108 infra.
15. In general the doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies to
invalidate the revocation of a will where it is shown that the revocation was
conditioned on the occurrence of certain facts which never came to pass or upon
the existence or nonexistence of circumstances which were either absent or
present contrary to the condition. The courts very frequently apply the same
doctrine where the revocation is carried out because of a purely mistaken frame
of mind rather than a conditional frame of mind; but the courts still persist in
calling it a conditional revocation. The end result in this type of case is perhaps
proper, but it would be much better to recognize it for what it is, a mistake, and
then proceed to formulate the proper rule. A mistaken frame of mind is really
quite different from a conditional frame of mind, and it involves a needless and
highly fictional process to pretend that an act unconditionally done by a person
who never doubts the truth of the erroneous beliefs which motivate him is in
reality done conditionally.
2 PAGE, supra note 8, at § 21.57.
16. Such is the case when there is an express conditional intent. See notes 27-51 and
accompanying text infra.
17. ATKINSON, supra note 11, at § 88, 463.
18. 358 Pa. 271, 56 A.2d 201 (1948).
19. Id. at 273, 56 A.2d at 202 (emphasis added).
20. See notes 101-05 and accompanying text infra.
distinction between the testator's actual intent to revoke and the construc-
tive, conditional intent to revoke, which is created by the doctrine.2 1 The
actual intent in the applicable case must always be to revoke the original
will or bequest and to make a new provision.
A Braun-type error is committed when courts misapply the maxim
that "[t]he pole star in the construction of every will is the testator's
intent." 22 In the ordinary case, the ability of a court to infer or impute
intent is strictly limited to the meaning of the words as they appear on the
face of the instrument.
In determining the testator's intention-if no uncertainty
or ambiguity exists-his meaning must be ascertained from the
language of his will; it is not what the court thinks he might or
would have said in the existing circumstances, or even what the
court thinks he meant to say, but what is the meaning of his
words .23
The point is that the doctrine of dependent relative revocation does
not apply to the ordinary case, in which a revocation must be accepted at
face value. Rather, it applies in the unusual case in which the former and
subsequent dispositions of a will "interpreted together" 24 -raise the
inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon
the efficacy of the new disposition intended to be substituted.
' 25
Thus, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation requires "look-
ing beyond" the mechanical meaning of the instruments to achieve a
more equitable result than would be achieved by adherence to strict
canons of construction. Since the actual intent of the testator to provide a
substitute cannot be carried out,2 6 the court invokes the doctrine to grant
the next best relief, which is the gift contained in the former will or
bequest.
B. Express Conditional Revocation
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation should not apply when
the intent of the testator is expressly conditional. 27 There is no need to
21. See note 15 supra.
22. Wright Estate, 380 Pa. 106, 107, 110 A.2d 198, 199 (1955).
23. Id. at 108, 110 A.2d at 199; Conner's Estate, 346 Pa. 271, 29 A.2d 514 (1943).
24. Braun Estate, 358 Pa. 271, 275, 56 A.2d 201, 203 (1948).
25. JARMAN, supra note 7, at 135. Jarman's definition apparently renders the doctrine
applicable to conditional revocations.
26. It would appear to have been a rare case in which the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation was invoked and the testator's true intent was carried out. This occurred
when the former and subsequent provisions were identical in all material aspects. Curiously
enough, in Pennsylvania the doctrine has been expressly applied only in such cases. See
notes 101-20 and accompanying text infra.
27. For example, a testator might make a will and in a codicil state that the first will
should remain in effect in its unamended state unless the testator lives past a specified date.
If the testator does not live until that date, the express condition will be given effect and the
original will remains unrevoked. Hamilton's Estate, 74 Pa. 69 (1873). This situation arose in
a case in which a provident testator conditioned the efficacy of a second will upon his
surviving the thirty-day period essential to the validity of charitable gifts. The court fol-
lowed the letter of the testator's intent and held that the original will remained in force.
Bradish v. McClellan, 100 Pa. 607 (1882).
construct the edifice of fictional, conditional intent if the conditional
intent has been provided expressly by the testator. In this case, a court
must follow the dictates of the testator's intent and should not resort to
unnecessary and confusing constructions. The doctrine applies only when
the revocation, standing alone, is effective and unconditional.28 The
revocation can be express or implied,2 9 but it cannot be expressly condi-
tional.
A problem of interpretation arises when the testator states reasons or
facts upon which he based his revocation or subsequent disposition.30 The
classic decision in this area is the English case of Campbell v. French,31
in which a gift to certain grandchildren was revoked, "they being all
dead." 32 The revocation did not have its effect because they were in fact
alive. 33 No absolute rule has been developed to dispose of this situation,
although Page makes a distinction between a recital of reasons or facts
that are apparently material to the change in the will and reasons or facts
that do not appear to have affected the testator's actions. 34 The situation
also can be viewed as one of mistake.
35
C. The Relation of the Doctrine to Relief for Mistake
In general, the plain meaning of the language of a will is honored
without resort to the rules of construction. 36 Given the presumptions that
the testator knows the contents and legal effect of a will, courts have been
generally unwilling to grant relief in cases of mistake. Nevertheless,
some courts, within strict limits, are willing to grant relief for certain
kinds of mistake. The mistake, however, "must appear on the face of the
will, and it must also appear what would have been the will of the
testatrix but for the mistake."
37
Several leading authorities have recognized that the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation has its basis in granting relief for mistake.
38
28. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
29. Braun Estate, 358 Pa. 271, 56 A.2d 201 (1948) (express revocation); Shelly Will, 27
Pa. Fiduc. 42 (O.C. Montg. 1976) (implied revocation).
30. See 2 PAGE, supra note 8, at § 21.64 (Supp. 1976).
31. 3 Ves. Jr. 321, 30 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1797).
32. Id. at 321, 30 Eng. Rep. at 1033.
33. Id.
34. 2 PAGE, supra note 8, at § 21.64 (Supp. 1976).
35. See note 37 and accompanying test infra.
36. Lyman Estate, 366 Pa. 164, 76 A.2d 633 (1950). In Earle Estate, 369 Pa. 52, 85
A.2d 90 (1952), the court stated that "it is our first duty to examine the will and if possible
ascertain its meaning without reference to canons of construction." Id. at 56,85 A.2d at 93.
"It has long been established that, execution of a will having been proved, knowledge of the
contents is presumed." Rusinki Will, 14 Pa. Fiduc. 30 (O.C. Montg. 1963). Also, "even if
persuaded by the testimony of contestants that the will in question does not represent
decedent's actual testamentary intention, the court is unable to upset the unambiguous
provisions of the will." Id. at 34.
37. Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R.I. 99, 57 Am. Dec. 708 (1852).
38. The leading article on the subject is Warren, supra note 6. See also ATKINSON,
supra note 11, at § 88; 2 PAGE, supra note 8, at §§ 21.57-.65; Cornish, Dependent Relative
Revocation, 5 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 393 (1932); Evans, Testamentary Revocation by Act to
The mistake of the testator, whether of fact 39 or of law, 4° results in a
defect in the substitution. In Pennsylvania, the nature of the cause of the
defect will determine whether the doctrine will apply. 4 Although the
definitions of Jarman 42 and Atkinson43 base no distinction on the nature
of the cause of the defect, the Pennsylvania courts distinguish between
defects that are intrinsic and extrinsic. 44 The distinction has arisen merely
as a means of limiting or denying application of the doctrine. Two
modern authors have criticized the distinction as follows:
It is quite apparent from the cases that the origin of this distinc-
tion lay in cases concerning the invalidity of charitable gifts
made within thirty days of death, which invalidity results from
statute and is therefore extrinsic. The perpetuation of this dis-
tinction hardly seems justified since the enactment of the Wills
Act of 1947, wherein it is provided that substituted charitable
gifts shall be valid to the extent that they were valid in the
original testamentary writing, notwithstanding death within
thirty days. In other words, the vitality of the distinction has
been weakened by statute with regard to charitable gifts, while
it apparently subsists in the area of noncharitable gifts. .... 41
If the courts were to recognize that the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation was devised to grant relief from mistakes, problems such as
the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction might be avoided. 46 This simplification
might also avert the present judicial opposition to the expansion of the
doctrine. 
47
the Document and Dependent Relative Revocation, 23 Ky. L.J. 559 (1935); Palmer, Depen-
dent Relative Revocation and its Relation to Relief for Mistake, 69 MICH. L. REV. 989 (1971).
39. Campbell v. French, 3 Ves. Jr. 321, 30 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1797) (testator mistakenly
believed his possible beneficiaries were all dead; consequently, he revoked a former will).
40. McClure's Estate, 309 Pa. 370, 165 A. 24 (1933) (failure of execution in accordance
with the provisions of the Wills Act).
41. The difference in effect when the defect is caused by intrinsic or extrinsic failure
is discussed in Holt Estate, 405 Pa. 244, 174 A.2d 874 (1961), and in Braun Estate, 358 Pa.
271, 56 A.2d 201 (1948).
42. See note 7 and accompanying text supra. Jarman would apply the doctrine
whether the defect was intrinsic or extrinsic to the instrument.
43. See note I I and accompanying text supra. Atkinson would apply the doctrine to
mistakes of law or fact. He does not include intrinsic or extrinsic bases for the defect in his
definition.
44. See note 41 supra and note 99 and accompanying text infra. An intrinsic defect is
apparent on the face of the will and is limited to a defect in the execution of the will. An
extrinsic defect falls outside the instrument itself.
45. Walsh & Jones, Dependent Relative Revocation, 67 DICK. L. REV. 275, 281-82
(1963). 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2507 (Purdon 1977) validates charitable gifts made within
thirty days of death to the extent of a former charitable gift if the person who would benefit
from the invalidity of the gift raises no objection. In Estate of Cavill, 459 Pa. 411, 329 A.2d
503 (1974), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the statute invalidating all charita-
ble or religious gifts included in a will executed within thirty days of death denies charitable
beneficiaries equal protection of the laws and is unconstitutional.
46. Pennsylvania case law apparently does not discuss the doctrine's genesis in relief
for mistake.
47. See notes 48-54 and accompanying text infra. If it were accepted by the courts
that the doctrine had its basis in granting relief for certain types of mistake (i.e. when the
mistake is apparent on the face of the dispositive instrument and when there is sufficient
evidence as to what the testator probably would have preferred), a fair question would be
presented as to whether there is a real need for a separate doctrine. In short, courts might be
able to dispense with the doctrine and allow relief for mistake under the circumstances.
Professor Warren advocates this position.
III. Application of the Doctrine in Pennsylvania
A. The Prevailing Judicial Attitude Toward the Doctrine
In general, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation "is not
favored in [the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania] and has rarely been
applied.' '48 In McClure's Estate,49 in which the court expressly refused
to apply the doctrine, Justice Kephart commented,
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation, an inferred
intention of the testator, to be applied under given circum-
stances, has not as yet been accepted in its arbitrary form in this
State. For its satisfactory solution there is nothing to lead the
judicial mind with anything approaching logical certainty to the
testatrix's real intent, when the provision of the second will
fails either from internal of external causes.50
In Braun Estate,5' the leading Pennsylvania decision expressly
applying the doctrine, the court indicated its discomfort with the doc-
trine. 52 Similarly, in Holt Estate,53 in which it again refused to apply the
doctrine, the court stated that "[the doctrine] usually furnished only
speculation or a wild guess as to testator's intention to make his absolute
revocation merely conditional." 54
Although there has been neither a blanket acceptance nor rejection of
the doctrine, the most recent case in which it was expressly applied,
Shelly Will,55 severely limits the doctrine's application. 56 In another
recent Pennsylvania decision, Baily Estate ,5 the court held that Jarman's
rendition of the doctrine "generally represents the law as it now stands,
although [Jarman's definition] is perhaps a little too broadly stated."
5 8
The propensity of Pennsylvania courts to limit or refuse to apply the
doctrine is not shared by courts in other jurisdictions.
59
It is believed that this classification is loose and misleading, that the term
"dependent relative revocation," while not entirely devoid of inherent sense,
tends toward the treatment of different subjects under a single principle, and
should be abandoned for more specific and discriminating nomenclature.
Warren, supra note 6, at 338.
48. Holt Estate, 405 Pa. 244, 250, 174 A.2d 874, 877 (1961) (the doctrine was denied
application).
49. 309 Pa. 370, 165 A. 24 (1932).
50. Id. at 373, 165 A. at 25.
51. 358 Pa. 271, 56 A.2d 201 (1948).
52. While the learned court below correctly observed that the doctrine 'is
not forbidden by the authorities in Pennsylvania, . . . it was also said that the
doctrine 'has not as yet been accepted in its arbitrary form in this state.' Just what
its 'arbitary' form may be or what the caution was intended to mean, in terms of
the Rule's availability in Pennsylvania, was not further explained or defined.
Id. at 273-74, 56 A.2d at 202 (citations omitted).
53. 405 Pa. 244, 174 A.2d 874 (1961).
54. Id. at 250-51, 174 A.2d at 877.
55. 27 Pa. Fiduc. 42 (O.C. Montg. 1976).
56. When the former and subsequent dispositions are exactly alike in all material
aspect, it is obvious that the testator probably would have preferred the former disposition
to intestacy. See note 115 and accompanying text infra.
57. 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 225 (O.C. Montg. 1964).
58. Id. at 234.
59. See notes 135-44 and accompanying text infra.
B. Prerequisites to the Doctrine's Application
For the doctrine to be applied, three conditions must be met: (1)
there must be a valid, original will; (2) it must be effectively revoked; and
(3) an invalid substitution must be made that is similar enough in kind or
amount to permit the inference that the testator would probably have
preferred the former will over any other possible disposition.'
Thus, the doctrine will not save a former will or bequest that was not
valid at the time it was executed. The doctrine does not improve or
diminish the validity of former or subsequent dispositions; it only re-
moves the effect of an otherwise effective revocation. The focus of the
doctrine is on the "character of the revocation."
6'
I. The Character of the Revocation.-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court confronted the doctrine of dependent relative revocation for the
first time in Price v. Maxwell. 62 A strict interpretation of Price63 would
deny application of the doctrine whenever there was an express, uncondi-
tional revocation.64 Today this view has been relaxed to allow the doc-
trine to apply when there is a clause in a subsequent invalid will or codicil
expressly revoking the former, valid will. 65 To allow an express revoca-
tion to stand in all cases is to misunderstand the import of the doctrine and
to limit its application illogically and unnecessarily.
A comparison of former and subsequent dispositions is essential to
determine the degree of continuity and consistency between the two. 66 It
is logical for a testator to include a clause expressly revoking a former
will when he desires to make a second will. The testator wants to give full
effect to the subsequent disposition, which he mistakenly believes is
valid, and to avoid confusion and resultant litigation concerning the
former disposition. The effect of denying the doctrine's application to
60. This "definition" represents the state of the doctrine of dependent relative revo-
cation as it has been applied and interpreted by the Pennsylvania courts. Thus, the "defini-
tion" is an abstraction and does not appear in any Pennsylvania case as such.
61. Braun Estate, 358 Pa. 271, 275, 56 A.2d 201, 203 (1948).
62. 28 Pa. 23 (1857).
63. Id. at 38 (there is language that could be misinterpreted to sustain an express
revocation despite the presence of other facts).
64. After determining that the former and subsequent dispositions were manifestly
inconsistent, the court said, "But it is not necessary to regard these circumstances, because
we have an express clause of revocation [in the later will], and that clause is not in any
respect avoided or impaired. . . . It stands in full force. The result is, that the [former will]
is revoked." Id. at 38-39. The court added, "We have no right to add conditions not
expressed by the testator, nor implied from his acts. He had it in his power to make
conditions, but he made none, and we can make none for him." Id. at 39.
65. Braun Estate, 358 Pa. 271, 56 A.2d 201 (1948) (express revocation by subsequent
codicil); Shelly Will, 27 Pa. Fiduc. 42 (O.C. Montg. 1976) (express revocation by subsequent
will).
66. "The authorities .. confine therule, in Pennsylvania, to those cases where the
apparent purpose of the revocation of an initial disposition is to make way for a subsequent
one of a similar kind or type, and the subsequent one fails from a defect in the instrument
creating it." Baily Estate, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 225, 234 (O.C. Montg. 1964). See note 115 and
accompanying text infra.
cases of express revocation would be to refuse aid to the more provident,
but equally mistaken, testators.
The doctrine necessarily applies when there is no express revoca-
tion, but an implied revocation evidenced by either an inconsistent provi-
sion in a codicil 67 or by a new will purportedly disposing of the entire
estate. 68 Nevertheless, a distinction has been maintained between the
revocatory effect of a will and a codicil. 69
2. Subsequent Will or Codicil.-In Hartman's Estate (No. 1),70
the court held that "a will, complete within its four corners, which makes
a disposition of all the property of testatrix . . . , is clearly incompatible
with the existence of any former will and must operate as a revocation of
all wills previously executed by the testatrix." 71 Thus, a subsequent will
''must operate as a revocation without express words to that effect."72 On
the other hand, in Bingaman's Estate,73 a later instrument, although
referred to as a will, was in effect a codicil.74 It revoked all former wills
"excepting only so much of the same as relate to the charitable gifts,
bequests and devises, which are set forth and made in a former will
... ,," The court looked beyond form to substance and found the later
instrument to be a codicil. 76 Therefore, a codicil revokes the provisions of
a former will only to the extent that they are inconsistent. In Mifflin's
Estate 77 the court explained,
The will and the codicils are to be read together, and all the
parts which are not inconsistent with the latest expression of
the testator's intention are brought down to the date of the last
codicil and are to be given effect. A new will revokes a former
will, but a codicil ratifies the preceding will except as to the
changes expressly indicated. A revocation is not be presumed
in the case of a codicil. It is only when they are irreconcilably
contradictory that the dispositions contained in a codicil revoke
those made by the will or a preceding codicil. 78
Application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation does not
depend on whether the subsequent provision is a will or codicil.
79
Nevertheless, language in a few Pennsylvania decisions suggests that the
67. Baily Estate, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 225 (O.C. Montg. 1964).
68. Shelly Will, 27 Pa. Fiduc. 42 (O.C. Montg. 1976).
69. See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
70. 320 Pa. 321, 182 A.2d 234 (1936).
71. Id. at 326, 182 A.2d at 236.
72. Teacle's Estate, 153 Pa. 219, 223, 25 A. 1135, 1136 (1893).
73. 281 Pa. 497, 127 A. 73 (1924).
74. Id. at 506, 127 A. at 77.
75. Id. at 505, 127 A. at 76.
76. Id.
77. 49 Pa. Super. Ct. 605 (1912).
78. Id. at 608.
79. This is not meant to deny the difference in the revocatory effect of a will or
codicil. In the situation in which the doctrine of dependent relative revocation clearly does
not apply-the former and latter provisions are inconsistent and irreconcilable-the distinc-
tion between the revocatory effect of a will or codicil is material. Nevertheless, if the facts
indicate a continuity and consistency between the instruments, which suggests possible
doctrine is more amenable to substitutions by codicil. 80 Apparently, the
courts cannot overcome the view that a second will revokes all former
wills in all cases. The distinction is spurious because the doctrine looks
beyond the immediate form of the substitution to the substantive con-
sideration of the continuity and consistency of the contents of the two
instruments." l Thus, the character of the revocation is determined by
comparing the contents of the former and latter instruments.
82
3. The Requirement of an Invalid Substitution. -The doctrine of
dependent relative revocation applies only if a substitution has been made
and subsequently fails. This essential element is illustrated in Holt Es-
tate83 in which the decedent had written across the botton of his will, "I
hereby render this will void and intend to make one revised."g, In the
words of Chief Justice Bell of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, "Holt
never made another will. The question we must decide is whether these
words effectively revoked Holt's will or whether the principle of depen-
dent relative revocation applies.'85 Holt's widow contended the words,
"and intend to make one revised," rendered the purported revocation
dependent and conditional and hence ineffectual because a revised will
was never executed. 86 The court explicitly rejected this attempt to extend
the logic of Braun87 and held that "the unfulfilled intention to execute a
new will did not render the revocation ineffective. "88 The court con-
cluded,
[W]e cannot know or say with any accuracy or certainty-
indeed it is the sheerest speculation-whether decedent would
change his mind or carry out his intention to make a new will
and if so what decedent would or might have provided in a new
will. What we believe is clear and certain is that decedent did
not wish or intend to dispose of his estate under his [former
will] which he specifically said he rendered void.89
The effect of the revocation, whether express or implied, is deter-
mined in light of the relationship between the provisions of a former will
application of the doctrine, the interjection of irrelevant arguments distinguishing wills and
codicils merely causes confusion and should be avoided. See PA. JUR., supra note 8, at §
262.
80. Thus, language from Teacle's Estate and Hartman's Estate (see notes 67-69 and
accompanying text supra) can be given undue weight. "The most plausible rationale for the
rule may be that testator could make no more dramatic or conclusive expression of an intent
to revise his testamentary scheme than through the preparation of a new will." Walsh &
Jones, supra note 45, at 285. This is incorrect since the doctrine's application clearly
depends on the extent of the revision, in substantive terms, not whether the new provision is
a will or codicil.
81. See note 115 and accompanying text infra.
82. Id.
83. 405 Pa. 244, 174 A.2d 874 (1961).
84. Id. at 248, 174 A.2d at 876.
85. Id. at 247, 174 A.2d at 875.
86. Id. at 248, 174 A.2d at 876.
87. Id. at 249, 174 A.2d at 876.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 250, 174 A.2d at 877.
and the subsequent, invalid substitutions. 90 A comparison between the
two dispositions is essential to determine what the testator would prob-
ably have preferred. The substitution, although invalid, provides guid-
ance as to the testator's intention concerning the ultimate disposition of
his estate, 91 which the court requires in the construction of its fictional
intent. Without this evidence the court is justified in its unwillingness to
build on what is already a speculative venture.
92
4. The Reason for the Failure of the Substitute Provision.-On
several occasions the Pennsylvania courts have distinguished between
intrinsic and extrinsic defects in the substitute provision. 93 In Braun
Estate,94 the failure of the codicil was intrinsic to the instrument and
relief was granted. 9 In Hartman's Estate (No. 1) 96 and in Price v.
Maxwell, 97 gifts to charity failed because they were made within thirty
days of death-extrinsic failures beyond the immediate instrument-and
the doctrine was denied application. In Holt Estate98 the court said in
dictum,
It is clear from all of the authorities herein cited that (1) the
doctrine as applied by our Courts is primarily a rule of tes-
tamentary construction which is used as an aid in ascertaining
the intent of the testator, and (2) the doctrine has been applied
only where there is (a) either a defective execution of a subse-
quent will or codicil or (b) an intrinsic defect in the subsequent
will or codicil. However, where the revoking instrument is in
itself valid and operative, but the subsequent disposition fails
for some extrinsic reason such as the incapacity of the devisee
to take, the revocation nevertheless remains effective.99
The distinction has been critized by Pennsylvania commentators,
00
but the courts in all probability will continue to apply the distinction to
avoid the doctrine.
C. Express Application of the Doctrine
1. The Requirement of Continuity and Consistency.-The leading
case in Pennsylvania in which the doctrine was expressly applied is
Braun Estate. 1 In Braun Estate the testator originally bequeathed a
90. See note 115 and accompanying text infra.
91. See notes 115-18 and accompanying text infra.
92. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
94. 358 Pa. 271, 56 A.2d 201 (1948).
95. Id. at 273, 56 A.2d at 202 (failure for indefiniteness).
96. 320 Pa. 321, 182 A. 234 (1936).
97. 28 Pa. 23 (1857).
98. 405 Pa. 244, 174 A.2d 874 (1961).
99. Id. at 251, 174 A.2d at 877 (citations omitted).
100. "Whether [failure] is due to intrinsic or extrinsic causes seems to make less
practical difference, insofar as many of the reported cases are concerned .... Jones &
Walsh, supra note 45, at 286; see AKER, PROBATE AND INTERPRETATION OF WILLS § 3.14m
(1976).
101. 358 Pa. 271, 56 A.2d 201 (1948).
sum of $50,000 to his executors in trust for his adopted daughter. 102 In a
codicil the testator wrote, "I hereby revoke the trust fund in favor of my
daughter . . .and substitute a lump sum of [ ] dollars in cash."' 3
Mrs. Braun, the residuary legatee, contended that the provisions in the
codicil constituted an unqualified revocation of the legacy in trust as
bequeathed by the will and that the substitution, absent a specific dollar
amount, was void for uncertainty. 0 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that the doctrine of dependent relative revocation applied and the
revocation was ineffectual. 105
Once the Braun court supplied the blank amount,' 0 6 the former and
latter provisions were identical in all material aspects. Thus, in awarding
the former bequest, the court was assured that it had done nothing to
violate what the testator would probably have preferred. Braun has been
followed by at least two Pennsylvania courts that have applied the
doctrine to sustain a former bequest because the later invalid bequest was
identical in all material aspects.' 07 The content of the invalid substitution
is the best gauge of the testator's actual intent.108
In Braun, having determined that the amounts of both bequests were
equal, the court said that "the so-called revocation in this case was not a
revocation even though the testator tabulated it as such. The provision in
the codicil was in truth a 'substitutional bequest.' "'19 The codicil merely
changed the time of payment, which corresponded to the length of time
that had passed since the making of the original will. "0 The court in
Braun based its decision on Sloan's Appeal,I' in which the testator, by
102. She was to receive the income quarterly after she reached the age of twenty-one
and the fund outright when she reached the age of thirty-five. Id. at 273, 56 A.2d at 202.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 277, 56 A.2d at 204.
105. Id. at 278, 56 A.2d at 204.
106. The case can be viewed as presenting an evidence problem in the area of wills.
Parol evidence is admissible to clarify ambiguities and uncertain terms in a dispositive
instrument; the evidence, however, cannot contradict the express language in the writing.
See Horvath's Estate, 446 Pa. 484, 288 A.2d 725 (1972); England's Estate, 414 Pa. 115, 200
A.2d 897 (1964).
107. Shelly Will, 27 Pa. Fiduc. 42 (O.C. Montg. 1976); Baily's Estate, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d
225 (O.C. Montg. 1964).
108. If no new provision is made, the court must accept the revocation at face value.
Even if it can be proved that the testator would have made a similar will or bequest but died
before doing so, a revocation that has been made will be honored. The theory is that the
testator might change his mind before writing a new will or bequest and the court will not
presume that a future will or bequest is an exact replica of the former will unless the actual
instrument is laid before it. See Holt Estate, 405 Pa. 244, 174 A.2d 874 (1961). To a large
degree Holt was based on Emernecker's Estate, 218 Pa. 369, 67 A. 701 (1907).
109. 358 Pa. 271, 276, 56 A.2d 201, 204 (1948). In an early Pennsylvania decision,
Lutz's Estate, 27 W.N.C. 403 (O.C. Phila. 1890), the court stressed the requirement of a
substitution, but did not require continuity or consistency between the former and latter
bequests. Nevertheless, the later Pennsylvania cases clearly indicate that continuity and
consistency are essential. See notes 115-18 and accompanying text infra.
110. The testator's adopted daughter was a teenager when the original will was made
and thirty-one years old when the codicil was made. Apparently the reason for the trust fund
had been eliminated.
111. 168 Pa. 422,32 A. 42(1895).
codicil, purported to revoke a prior testamentary bequest, but merely
changed "the time of payment of the bequest so as to give the interest to
the persons named in the codicil while they lived."" ' 2
In Shelly Will, 113 a recent case that expressly followed Braun, the
doctrine was invoked to save a former will that in all material respects
was republished by a later invalid will." 4 After a lengthy review of the
pertinent legal principles, the court succinctly stated the basis for the
doctrine's application in Pennsylvania:
If we seek to find the testatrix's intent in signing her name
to the alleged revoking will . . the best gauge of that and one
which the courts of the Commonwealth have used in dealing
with such a problem, . . is to analyze the provisions of the
two instruments, to ascertain if there is a continuity and consis-
tency between the earlier and later testamentary dispositions. II
In Baily Estate, " 6 the doctrine was held to apply when a charitable
gift contained in subsequent codicils was invalid for lack of attestation. 
117
The court explained,
By the codicils, testator did not indicate any intention to
extinguish his initial testamentary scheme. On the contrary,
they show most strongly further thought and refinement of his
original plan. The benefits which he originally conferred upon
local charities were changed in form and somewhat in amount,
but this represents [a] . . . technical rather than substantial
change . . . .Testator's alteration of his original bequest for
. . .the same purpose is, likewise, merely refinement of his
original concept." 8
To date, the doctrine has been applied sparingly in Pennsylvania," 9
and the modem cases indicate that it wilJ be expressly applied only when
there is at least a near identity and when there are no material discrepan-
cies between the former and latter provisions. 120 This is not meant to
imply that the doctrine cannot be invoked to grant relief when there are
material alterations. Instead, it only acknowledges that in such cases the
doctrine has not been expressly applied, although the court may have
invoked it sub silentio.121
D. Changes in a Subsequent Will or Codicil
I. Change of Beneficiary.-In Pennsylvania the doctrine of de-
l12. Id. at 430, 32 A. at 44. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation was not
expressly applied, although it could have been applied. The case was decided on the
principles of the revocatory effect of a codicil, which republishes a will to the extent both
are consistent. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
113. 27 Pa. Fiduc. 42 (O.C. Montg. 1976).
114. "The two wills have slight variations between them, but the basic and overall plan
is similar in each." Id. at 50.
115. Id. at 60 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
116. 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 225 (O.C. Montg. 1964).
117. Id. at 235.
118. Id.
119. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
120. See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 147-68 and accompanying text infra.
pendent relative revocation will not be applied when there has been a
change of beneficiary.122 Pennsylvania legal scholars have reasoned that
"the refusal to apply dependent relative revocation in such cases is
logical; where the testator cancels an executor or beneficiary in favor of a
substituted appointee, it is fairly clear that his act arose as much out of a
desire to remove the former as it did out of a desire to favor the latter." 1
23
Thus, in Melville's Estate, 24 the testator revoked the residuary legatees
under his original will by a subsequent codicil. 125 The codicil provided
for a gift to charity that failed because the testator died within thirty days
after execution of the codicil. 26 The doctrine was denied, and the will
was deemed void. 127 Arguably such a rigid rule does not accomplish the
best result in all cases,' 28 and other states have recently recognized this in
applying the doctrine to a change in beneficiaries.'
29
2. Increase or Decrease in the Pecuniary Amount.-In Kirk Es-
tate, 130 the doctrine was held not to apply since there was only one will,
in which the paragraph giving the entire estate to the appellant was
obliterated, and an attempted codicil, which gave her a much smaller
bequest and indicated that three new heirs were to benefit. 13' The court
acknowledged the highly factual considerations in applying or denying
the doctrine 32 and determined that the amount of the reduction was
evidence that the testator would probably have preferred that the benefi-
ciary be disinherited. 133 Similarly, Pennsylvania writers have reasoned,
Where the legacy is increased in the manner described, it has
been held that the original gift is valid, the theory being that the
ineffectual attempt to increase it is the very antithesis of an
intent to revoke the earlier gift. Although such interlineation is
not itself valid, because it is in the nature of a codicil, it is
nevertheless admissible as evidence of testator's intent. On the
other hand, where testator has by ineffectual interlineation
decreased the amount of a legacy, it cannot be argued that there
was no intent to revoke the gift, at least pro tanto. The question
122. See Ducommun Estate, 2 Pa. Fiduc. 69(O.C. Lanc. 1951); Swanson Estate, 74 Pa.
D. & C. 358 (O.C. Elk 1950).
123. Jones & Walsh, supra note 45, at 282.
124. 245 Pa. 318, 91 A. 679 (1914).
125. Id. at 320, 91 A. at 680.
126. Id. at 322, 91 A. at 681.
127. Id. at 324, 91 A. at 682.
128. A testator might prefer that a bequest be given to the former legatee rather than
have it fall into the residuary or have the entire will fail, resulting in intestacy. There are no
Pennsylvania cases in point, and the matter will probably remain academic because of the
overall resistance to the doctrine by the courts.
129. See, e.g., Oliver v. Union Nat'l Bank, 504 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. 1974) (the doctrine
applied to a change of beneficiaries coupled with increased shares going to other
beneficiaries. The attempted changed failed for want of attestation).
130. 41 Pa. D. & C.2d 777 (O.C. Phila. 1967).
131. Id. at 778-85.
132. "The matter of invoking the doctrine is always dependent on the circumstances
involved." Id. at 781.
133. Id. at 780-81.
is whether the legatee takes anything at all. There is dictum to
the effect that both the cancellation and the interlineation
should be disregarded and that the original gift be left unaffect-
ed. Logic would seem to dictate that the original gift should be
admitted as evidence of the extent to which testator intended it
to be modified.
134
While there are no Pennsylvania cases expressly applying the doc-
trine in the instance of an increased amount, other jurisdictions have
encountered this application of the doctrine. In Schneider v. Harring-
ton, ' the Massachusetts Supreme Court applied the doctrine of depen-
dent relative revocation to grant relief when the testatrix substituted an
increased share of the estate for two beneficiaries. 1 36 Originally, there
had been three beneficiaries, but one was cancelled and the shares of the
remaining two were increased from one-third of the estate to one-half
each.' 37 The court allowed the original lesser amount and held,
The doctrine is widely established that a revocation of a valid
will, which is so intimately connected with the making of
another will as to show a clear intent that the revocation of the
old is made conditional upon the validity of the new, fails to
become operative if the new will is void as a testamentary
disposition for want of proper execution. Revocation in its last
analysis is a question of intent. A revocation grounded on
supposed facts, which turn out not to exist, falls when the
foundation falls.
13 8
The reasoning permits the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
to apply in the case of mistake. 3 9 No attempt has been made to classify
the source of the mistake as intrinsic or extrinsic to the instrument.
In the celebrated case of Ruel v. Hardy, 14 the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire considered the applicability of the doctrine to a much
reduced amount.
The only inkling of intention to be gleaned from either the
clause or the entire will itself is found in the amount of the
reduction. Had the testatrix reduced the amount bequeathed to
a purely nominal sum, it would provide persuasive evidence
that she would prefer that the legatees have nothing rather than
that they should have the amount which she originally gave
them. On the other hand, a slight reduction would tend to show
a contrary intention. A reduction of eighty per cent of the
legacy tends more to show a preference on her that her legatees
134. Jones & Walsh, supra note 45, at 283 (citations omitted). The logic of the
foregoing is attractive; unfortunately, the cases cited as authority by the authors do not
expressly discuss the doctrine. Nevertheless, the doctrine may have been applied in a few of
the cited cases sub silentio. There is currently little Pennsylvania case law on the subject of
increases and decreases in subsequent provisions.
135. 320 Mass. 723, 71 N.E.2d 242 (1947).
136. Id. at 725, 71 N.E.2d at 243.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 725, 71 N.E.2d at 244 (quoting Sanderson v. Norcross, 242 Mass. 43, 45, 136
N.E. 170, 171 (1922), in which the court also referred to the doctrine as "a principle to be
applied with caution").
139. See note 15 supra.
140. 90 N.H. 119, 6 A.2d 753 (1939).
should have nothing rather than that they should have the full
sum, and since this is the only evidence in the case, the execu-
trix is informed that the legatees named in the third clause of
the codicil take nothing under it. 4 '
To apply or deny the doctrine because of the simplistic notion that an
increase or decrease creates an irrebutable presumption as to the testator's
intent would burden a doctrine based on a fiction with yet another
fiction.' 4 2 Such a rigid rule of thumb might be regretted later when
circumstances arise that tend to prove the reverse of the presumption. The
test might produce results that contradict what the testator would probably
have preferred. In Ruel'43 the court warned,
This is not by any means to say that the question of inten-
tion here presented is always to be solved by a mathematical
formula. Mathematics may shed a great deal of light on this
question of intent or it may shed only a little. It is only one of
the evidentiary facts which might be present in cases of this
sort, and its weight will vary in different cases. In the case at
bar this evidence is taken to be determinative only because it is
the only evidence available.144
It is reasonable to conclude that the amount of an increase or
decrease is evidence of animus revocandi, or its opposite, and nothing
more. The distinction between an intent to revoke and an intent to reduce
must be made if the doctrine is to remain flexible. A "continuity and
consistency between the earlier and later testamentary dispositions'
145
can be achieved regardless whether the change is an increase or decrease.
The amount of the decrease should be indicative of animus revocandi,1
46
while any increase should be viewed as evidence tending to prove its
absence.
E. Possible Applications of The Doctrine--Sub Silentio
There have been a number of Pennsylvania cases in which the
141. Id. at 128, 6 A.2d at 759.
142. A modern court exercising its equitable powers should be sophisticasted enough to
distinguish between an intent to revoke and an intent to reduce a legacy.
If the amount of the gift is reduced slightly, it might seem likely that testator
would prefer the original gift to nothing at all; but if the amount of the gift is
greatly reduced, it might seem likley that testator would prefer intestacy to the
original gift.
2 PAGE, supra note 8, at § 21.58.
143. 90 N.H. 119, 6 A.2d 753 (1939).
144. Id. at 129, 6 A.2d 759-60.
145. See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
146. Perhaps the solution to this problem does not depend upon the doctrine
of dependent relative revocation but rather on the proposition that there is a
distinction between an attempt to revoke a legacy and an intent simply to reduce
the amount given, and hence under the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude
that in striking out the original amount, the extent of the animus revocandi is
limited to the sum which is in excess of the reduced amount stated in the
interlineation. Since merely drawing a line through a legacy does not revoke it
unless the act was done with intent to revoke, it should follow that drawing the
line through the amount originally given with intent of reducing it to a stated
lesser sum should be construed as a revocation only to the extent intended and no
more. On this theory, the legatee would be entitled to the reduced amount.
PA. JUR., supra note 8, at § 266.
doctrine may have been applied, although it was not specifically men-
tioned by the court. 147 In Okowitz Will, , 8 the original will made bequests
of the residuary estate on a percentage basis, with one legatee receiving
"1 percent" of the estate. 149 On the will itself, the figure "2' was
written over the figure "1," an increase made without attestation.50 The
original will was held not to be revoked. 151 The doctrine of dependent
relative revocation was never mentioned in the court's decision; the case,
however, has been cited by subsequent writers as an example of the
doctrine's application to an invalid substitution of an increased
amount. 152 The result reached in Okowitz would have been the same had
the doctrine been expressly applied.' 53 Nevertheless the court did not
state the reasoning upon which it based its decision, but merely held that
the outcome of the present case had been determined by a previous case,
Molden Will.'1
Molden was, in turn, based on an earlier Pennsylvania decision,
Dixon's Appeal, 155 in which a testator refused or declined to sign his
name to a subsequent reduction of legacies to his three daughters.
156
Apparently the testator was operating under the mistaken belief that his
original signature was sufficient to validate the changes. 5 7 With ample
evidence from disinterested witnesses, the court admitted the former,
larger amounts to probate.' 5 8 Although the doctrine was not mentioned
the case has been cited as an example of the doctrine's application to the
case of a reduced amount. 159 This conclusion is unwarranted by the facts
or reasoning of the case, since it was decided according to the same
presumptions as Molden.
147. Okowitz Will, 403 Pa. 82, 169 A.2d 84 (1961); Molden Will, 387 Pa. 484, 128 A.2d
568 (1957); Dixon's Appeal, 28 Pa. 23 (1857); Lewis Will, 21 Pa. Fiduc. 468 (O.C. Del. 1970);
Rife Estate, 88 Pa. D. & C. 360 (O.C. Frank. 1954).
148. 403 Pa. 82, 169 A.2d 84 (1961).
149. Id. at 88, 169 A.2d at 85.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 97, 169 A.2d at 88.
152. PA. JUR., supra note 8, at § 265 (citing Okowitz as the only Pennsylvania case "in
which a testator draws a line through the amount of a legacy and tnakes an unsigned
interlienation stating a larger amount"); Jones & Walsh, supra note 45, at 283 n.55 (for the
relevant text of this article, see note 134 and accompanying text supra).
153. See notes 135-36 and accompanying text supra.
154. "On the authority of Molden, the restoration of the amount of this bequest to its
original figure was eminently correct." Okowitz Will, 403 Pa. 82, 90, 169 A.2d 84, 85 (1961)
(citing Molden Will, 387 Pa. 484, 128 A.2d 568 (1956)). In Molden, two substantial original
pecuniary bequests were cut in half by writings on the will itself. After the original amounts
had been determined by the use of a handwriting expert, the will was probated with the
original larger amounts. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation was not mentioned;
instead, the decision employed conventional presumptions flowing from the proven facts
that the document remained in the testator's possession and that all alterations were made
by him. Since the alterations were invalid, the original will was admitted to probate. Id. at
484-95, 128 A.2d at 570-71.
155. 55 Pa. 424 (1867).
156. Id. at 426.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Jones & Walsh, supra note 45, at 283; see text at note 141 supra.
In Lewis Will,"6 a more recent Pennsylvania decision, the testator
left a will in which the amounts of pecuniary bequests had been increased
by crossing out and interlineation.16' The court decided that the "testator
made the changes in the bequest.. at the date later than the original
'list' but the changed document was not republished or re-executed by the
testator." 162 The appellant, on the authority of Molden, contended that
the court should award the increased amounts, "because there is a
presumption that the paper was signed by the testator after the changes
were made .... ."163 The court found "no fault with the law in Mol-
den," but refused to consider Molden controlling.164 In Lewis, the
changes had been made with a different writing instrument, and the court
permitted this distinction to dispell the presumption.'
65
In the alternative, the appellant cited Okowitz "to sustain his posi-
tion that there cannot be held to be a revocation in this case where it
appears that testator was raising the amount of the bequest."' 66 The court
was "satisfied that originally testator intended a bequest. . . and that the
changes . . . were done later and the change never republished."' 67 The
original lower amount was awarded.
168
In all of the foregoing cases, the doctrine might have been applied
sub silentio and the result would have been the same. Two conclusions
can be reached. First, if a case can be decided by recourse to conventional
will principles and presumptions, the doctrine should be avoided. Sec-
ond, such cases cause confusion that could be avoided by express applica-
tion or denial of the doctrine.
IV. Recommendations and Conclusion
In McClure's Estate,'" the court said that the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation "has not been accepted in its arbitrary form in this
state.' 170 Noting this, the Braun court commented, "Just what its
,arbitrary' form may be or what the caution was intended to mean in
terms of the rule's availability in Pennsylvania was not further explained
160. 21 Pa. Fiduc. 468 (O.C. Del. 1965).
161. Id. at 469-70.




166. Id. The argument assumes the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.
167. Id. at 471. Thus, this language should dispell any idea that the case was decided by
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. Nevertheless, the case is indexed by the
Fiduciary Reporter as an example of the doctrine. See 21 Pa. Fiduc. (Cumulative Index
1971).
168. Lewis Will, 21 Pa. Fiduc. 468, 470 (1971). The case could have been decided by
expressly invoking the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The result would have
been the same. See also Rife Estate, 88 Pa. D. & C. 360 (O.C. Frank. 1954) (similar facts and
results; the doctrine was not mentioned).
169. 309 Pa. 370, 165 A. 24 (1933).
170. Id. at 373, 165 A. at 25.
or defined." 171 Problems of definition and application preclude an exact
delineation of the doctrine's limits in Pennsylvania. The court in Bailey
Estate,' 72 after quoting Jarman's definition,I 73vaguely commented that
the "quotation generally represents the law as it now stands, although it is
perhaps a little too broadly stated.'
' 74
The discernible trend is to limit the express application of the
doctrine to cases in which former and subsequent provisions share com-
mon elements. While the rationale for the doctrine is most acceptable
under these conditions, the experience of other jurisdictions indicates that
its expanded application can be effected without creating chaos in subse-
quent will contests.
Moreover, a serious problem exists if courts apply the doctrine sub
silentio. Under no circumstances should the doctrine be applied secretly,
since this inevitably results in confusion as to the true basis of the
decision. Speculation in this area is not reduced by avoiding the mention
of the doctrine when it is applied.
Although legal scholars base the doctrine on relief from mistake, the
courts have obfuscated the issue and appear unlikely to adopt such a
rationale for the sake of accuracy alone. Because of the judiciary's
obvious disdain for the doctrine, advocates should refrain from invoking
it unnecessarily in any event. The judicial attitude toward the doctrine is
not favorable and the advocate would be wise to adhere to conventional
will principles whenever possible. A network of subtle distinctions sur-
rounds the doctrine, which tends to limit or deny its application.
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173. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
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